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LABOR LAW: NLRB HOLDS GOVERNMENT INTERVEN-
TION A BAR TO REPRESENTATION ELECTION
IN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
A N ELECTION petition filed by a rival union seeking to replace a
certified bargaining representative often reveals a conflict between
two National Labor Relations Act policies-employee freedom of
self-organization and the stabilization of industrial relations through
collective bargaining.' In order to reconcile these cross-purposes of
the act, Congress and the National Labor Relations Board have
acted to regulate the timeliness of election petitions. The Taft-
Hartley amendments to the act, for example, provide that election
petitions will not be entertained when filed within one year after a
previously conducted election in the bargaining unit.2 The Board,
utilizing the broad power delegated to it by Congress to administer
the act,3 has promulgated rules that prohibit, in most instances,
entertainment of an election petition filed where there is a valid
collective bargaining contract4 existing between the employer and
the certified bargaining representative. 5 The latter rule, known as
1 Compare National Labor Relations Act § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1958) with § 7 of the act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). See generally
MILLIs & BROWN, FROm THE WAGNER Acr TO TArT-HARTLEY 155 (1950); Daykin,
The Contract as a Bar to a Representation Election, 10 LAB. Lj. 219 (1959); Feldes-
man, Contract Bar to Representation Elections, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 450 (1960);
Friedin, The Board, the "Bar," and the Bargain, 59 COLUMf. L. REV. 61 (1959);
Lahne, The Duration of Labor Agreements and the Contract Bar Doctrine of the
National Labor Relations Board, 5 SYRACUSE L. REV. 146, 147 (1954); Naumoff, The
New NLRB Contract Bar Rules (A Summary and Evaluation), N.Y.U. 12rM ANNUAL
CONF. ON LAB. 253 (1959); Van Arkel, Twenty Years of the NLRB: Unit and Contract
Bar Problems in Representation Cases, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 360 (1955).
2 Labor Management Relations Act § 9(e) (3), 61 Stat. 145 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
159 (e) (3) (1958).
3National Labor Relations Act §§ 6, 9 (b)- (c), 61 Stat. 140, 143-44 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 156, 159 (b)- (c) (1958).
4 To act as a bar the contract must be in writing, be signed by the parties, and
contain sufficient terms and conditions of employment to guide adequately the
day-to-day bargaining relationship. Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B.
1160 (1958). The collective agreement must be complete and final, not merely
temporary, to act as a bar. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121
N.L.R.B. 990 (1958); Remington Rand Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1958).
rContracts have been refused bar status when they contained a clause which was
either illegal on its face or had previously been declared illegal in an unfair labor
practice proceeding. See, e.g., Gary Steel Supply Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1963)
(check-off clause); Paragon Prods. Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662 (1961) (union security
clause). But see Food Haulers, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 394 (1962) (contract accorded bar
status despite hot-cargo clause). A substantial increase in the working force during
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the contract bar rule,6 bars an election petition filed by a rival
union until expiration of the contract or until the maximum bar
period of three years from the date of execution of the contract has
expired.7
In Aerojet-General Corp.,s the NLRB formulated a new bar rule
concerning the timeliness of rival union election petitions in the
aerospace industry." The Board held that federal government in-
tervention in collective bargaining between a prime producer of
missile components and the certified bargaining agent, barred an
election petition filed by a rival union even though no contract
existed at the time of filing.10
In Aerojet, the United Missile and Aerospace Technicians
(UMAT), an independent union formed by dissident employees
at the Aerojet-General Corporation," filed a petition for an election
the life of the contract may prevent it from acting as a bar. General Extrusion Co.,
121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958). The existence of a union schism may have the same effect.
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958). A new, independent business
operation will prevent a prior contract from acting as a bar, Buy Low Supermarket,
Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 23 (1961), but a mere expansion of an old operation will not.
Simmons Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 656 (1960).
0 The Board first clearly articulated the policy that an industrial contract would
bar an election in National Sugar Ref. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1939). See MILLis 9:
BROWN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 156.
7 The collective agreement is a bar for a reasonable length of time. See, e.g.,
Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927 (1947) (two year contract bar for full term
though duration longer than customary in industry); Owens-Illinois Pac. Coast Co.,
36 N.L.R.B. 990 (1941) (two year contract bar for full term when duration customary
in industry). To avoid burdensome administrative difficulties, the maximum reason-
able duration of a contract bar was fixed at two years in Pacific Coast Ass'n of
Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990 (1958), and was extended to three years
in General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). A thirty-day period beginning
ninety days before expiration of the contract or the maximum bar period is
reserved during which time election petitions may be filed by rival unions and
accepted as timely. The sixty days preceding expiration is an insulated period during
which election petitions are considered untimely and dismissed. Leonard Wholesale
Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962), modifying Deluxe Metal Furniture Co.,
121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958).
8 144 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (63-2 CGH NLRB) 12547 (Sept. 3,
1963).
0 By explicitly limiting the decision to the facts of the Aerojet case, the Board did
not commit itself to any future application of the new policy in the areospace
industry. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
10 The contract bar rule is administrative in nature and courts generally will not
interfere with the Board's application of the rule. NLRB v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Co., 241 F.2d 831 4th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126 (8th Cir.
1950); Local 492, Bakery Workers v. Schauttler, 162 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
11 Brief for Intervenor (TAM), p. 2; Brief for Petitioner (UMAT), p. 11. The
TAM contended that the UMAT was not a labor organization because it lacked the
indicia of a labor organization as set forth in § 201 (a) of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosures Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29
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some five months after the old contract between the employer and
the International Association of Machinists (IAM) had expired
and over one week before these same parties executed a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 12 Early in the five month interim
bargaining period, President Kennedy, concerned about the pros-
pect of a strike in this vital defense industry, asked for, and received,
a sixty day no-strike pledge from the IAM. 13 The President ap-
pointed a commission to study the dispute during this sixty day
period and to make suggestions for its solution.14 Despite these
efforts, the impasse continued and the employees struck the com-
pany.115 At the insistence of the Secretary of Labor, the strike was
halted after two days, and negotiations were continued in his office. 10
U.S.C. § 431 (a) (Supp. IV, 1963). Both the Regional Director and the Board rejected
this contention and stated that in § 603 (b) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat.
540 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 523 (b) (Supp. IV, 1963), Congress dearly manifested its
intent that provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act should not impair the operation
of the National Labor Relations Act. The UMAT was found to meet the qualifica.
tions of a labor organization as set forth in § 2 (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 61 Stat. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (5) (1958). See, e.g., Alto Plastics Mfg. Corp.,
136 N.L.R.B. 850 (1962); Hamilton Bros., 133 N.L.R.B. 868 (1961); Terminal System,
Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 979 (1960).
11 The new agreement called for a wage increase of twenty-two cents an hour over
a three year period. Fringe benefits were increased by an estimated twenty-seven
cents an hour. 86 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 69 (1963).
13 President Kennedy's telegram of July 21, 1962, read in part: "Major strikes
in this industry would substantially delay our vital missile and space program and
would be contrary to the national defense interest....
"In this important defense industry all parties have a responsibility to cooperate
in achieving a settlement without any interruption of work. Accordingly, I request
the parties to the disputes to continue work and operations for a period of sixty
days with the status quo being preserved under all of the terms and conditions of
the existing agreements. I further request the unions to withdraw all strike action
during this period." PRESIDENTIAL BOARD OF DISINGUISHED CITIZENS, REPORT OF TiE
STUDY OF LABOR DISPUTES IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 1-2 (Sept. 1, 1962).
14 The Presidential Board was appointed on July 21, 1962, to supplement the
efforts of the Federal Mediation and Condliation Service. The Board was chaired
by Dr. George W. Taylor, Professor of Industry, University of Pennsylvania, and
former head of the War Labor Board. FMCS, SYNOPSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL BOARDS OF
INQUIRY CREATED UNDER NATIONAL EMERGENCY PROVISIONS OF LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT, 1947 No. 22 (rev. Jan. 1963).
11 The employees at Aerojet-General struck on October 2, 1962, after previously
rejecting an employer proposal. The strike was only part of an industry wide crisis.
Before the critical situation had been alleviated, eighty day Taft-Hartley injunctions
were invoked at Republic Aircraft Corporation, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and
the Boeing Company, and five separate boards were established by executive order
to help solve disputes in the industry. Simkin, Aerospace Bargaining: Collective
Bargaining Does Work, 14 LAn. L.J. 834, 835 (1963).
18 Secretary Wirtz wired IAM President Hayes on October 2, 1962. The telegram,
in part, stated: "This strike action constitutes an intolerable threat to the Nation's
defense in view of the critical nature of Aerojet production as part of the missile
program. You ... are hereby requested to be present at a meeting tomorrow ... to
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Subsequently, the union membership rejected a proposal made by
the employer and recommended by IAM;17 UMAT then filed an
election petition. Since no contract existed at the time the peti-
tion was filed, the Regional Director, following clearly established
Board precedent, ordered an election.' 8
In reversing the order,19 the NLRB rejected the Regional Di-
rector's ruling that the facts of the case failed to justify a denial
of the employees' freedom of choice in the interest of industrial
stability.20 The Board observed that the IAM, in yielding to the
demands of the President and the Secretary of Labor, had sur-
rendered, in the public interest, its right to strike while government
intervention was pending. This surrender had removed an im-
portant source of union economic pressure, often needed to enforce
demands advantageous to the union and to expedite a return to a
contract protected status by speeding up negotiations. Further-
more, resorting to the more deliberate and compromising mecha-
nisms of government mediation made employee dissatisfaction with
the union more likely.21 Hence, the Board concluded that, if unions
were faced with the possibility of representational challenges during
discuss and seek settlement of all disputed issues.... Failure to do so will mean their
[IAM] necessary assumption of personal responsibility for weakening their Nation's
defenses.... [T~heir hold-up of the defense program has no justification...." Brief
for Intervenor, p. 5.
174 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 19772. The proposal was rejected by combined vote
of the employees at the employer's Sacramento and Azusa facilities. However, the
employees at Azusa later accepted the proposal without change before the election
petition was filed by the UMAT at the Sacramento plant.
' 1It is not clear that the Board shared the Regional Director's view that no agree-
ment existed between the employer and IAM sufficient for election bar purposes.
The Board declared that it would not hold that an entertainable question con-
cerning representation had been raised merely because the "settlement" reached
between the employer and the IAM "had not yet been consummated by a written
agreement." 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 19773. One report emphasizes the importance
of this interim agreement by inferring that it was a rationale behind the Aerojet
decision. See 14 LAB. L.J. 878. If this interpretation is correct, the Aerojet case
represents a substantial withdrawal from Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B.
1160 (1958), discussed supra note 4. The Board's reluctance to elaborate on this issue
suggests that its language indicates nothing more than an attempt to cast the new
policy against a most complimentary backdrop. The existence of the interim
agreement should not be regarded as an important rationale behind the decision.
See Groveton Papers Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1951); Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 87
N.L.R.B. 647 (1949).
10 Review was granted on the ground that a substantial question of law or policy
was presented as to whether the election should be barred. 4 CCI LAB. L. REP. at
19771. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67 (1963).
204 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 19772.
2Id. at 19773.
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a period of government intervention, they might well be unwilling
to cooperate to the extent of sacrificing their right to strike.22 Thus,
to entertain the election petition in the instant case would prove
detrimental to future government efforts to effectuate peaceful set-
tlements of disputes in the areospace industry23
The Board's apprehension that unions, if faced with possible
representational challenges, might not take part in government
sponsored procedures ignores the reality that government interven-
tion, accompanied by intense public pressure against production
stoppage in this vital defense industry, substantially eliminates the
unions' right to strike.24 Consequently, the only recourse in seek-
ing improved contract terms is to accept government sponsored
procedures.2 5
Although the fear expressed by the Board would not appear to be
sufficient grounds for refusing to entertain the election petition in
Aerojet, there are other compelling reasons for reaching this result.
As the Board recognized, to entertain the rival election petition
during the period of government intervention would be manifestly
unfair, unduly penalizing the union for operating in an industry
where a strike is not normally permitted.2 6 Another persuasive
reason for not entertaining the petition is the possible unsettling
22 Ibid.
2
3 Ibid.
24 Unions in the aerospace industry operating at companies which produce missile
hardware are not legally prevented from striking, since they are outside the jurisdic-
tion of the President's Missile Sites Labor Commission. Simkin, supra note 15, at
834. Nevertheless, government pressure has effectively nullified the use of the strike
in the industry except when production demands are low. See PRESIDENTIAL BOARD
OF DISTINGUISHED CITzENs, op. cit. supra note 13, at 18, 23-24. The only recent
prolonged strike ift the industry was a seventy-two day strike at a Republic Aviation
Corporation plant in 1962. This plant produced a low priority jet fighter plane,
however, and company operations there were about to be terminated. Simkin,
supra note 15, at 835.
2- One leading labor official has stressed the necessity of providing labor with a
third party forum when unions are unable to strike to enforce their demands.
Styles, Labor Relations in the Space Program, 14 LAB. L.J. 99, 100 (1963). Mr. Styles
advocates the establishment of something akin to the War Labor Board to arbitrate
disputes in the aerospace industry. Ibid. See note 31 infra.
24 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 19773. Through no fault of the incumbent union,
extrinsic circumstances have nullified the strike right. Consequently, the incumbent
union's ability to press for demands that would placate the union membership has
been diminished. This is especially true when such demands are for substantial
departures from present employment conditions, since the mediatory process typically
demands concessions from both sides. Thus, an incumbent union in an industry
where the use of the strike has been effectively eliminated would seem to face a more
severe task in thwarting internal dissension and disruption than does its counterpart
in an industry where the strike may be effectively employed.
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effect of an election upon the results of government intervention,
here the contract executed between the employer and the IAM
after the UMAT's election petition was filed.
Under present NLRB rules it appears that if the Board had en-
tertained the election petition, and the UMAT had won the elec-
tion, the UMAT would have been free to make new demands and,
under normal circumstances, strike to enforce them.2 7 The UMAT,
apparently seeking to avoid this obstacle, advised the Board that
it was willing to accept an election conditioned upon its assumption
of the new contract.28
Refusing to rule upon whether it had the power to condition
an election in this matter,29 the Board declared that such a determi-
'7 Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958); American Seating Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 250 (1953). Although there is no direct holding that a union winning such
an election may strike to enforce demands for contract changes, this is the logical
implication of the above cases which held that a winning union could bargain for
changes in the existing contract. Prior to the above cases the Board had held that
it would not decide in a representational proceeding whether the representative
to be certified would be required to assume the existing contract. Boston Mach.
Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59 (1950). See also Modine Mfgs. Co. v. Grand Lodge
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 216 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1954). Thus, even though any
union's right to strike appears illusory in the aerospace industry, demands by the
UMAT for contract changes might have necessitated another period of government
intervention.
2s4 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 19773 n.8. The UMAT presumably feared that the
Board might employ a "retroactive" contract bar rule under these special circumstances
in order to protect the fruits of government intervention.
"'Whether the Board has the power to condition an election upon assumption of
the existing contract is open to inquiry. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901
(1958), indicates that a rival union may voluntarily accede to a prior contract between
the employer and the ousted incumbent after winning an election. See also Great
Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1959) (assumption of existing contract
condition precedent to consent election).
Under the Hershey rule, however, a petitioning union cannot be required to as-
sume the existing contract as a condition precedent to a representation election.
One reason for this rule is that the employees' freedom to choose their bargaining
representative would have little meaning if the new bargaining representative could
do no more than administer an old contract which failed to reflect the desires
of the employees. On the other hand, if the petitioning union was not entitled to
an election, because of a discretionary Board policy, but agreed in advance to submit
to a conditioned election, the spirit of the Hershey rule would not be thwarted by
ordering such an election. In this situation the employees' freedom of choice would
not be abrogated, since the Board need not have allowed any election whatsoever.
Another difficulty in determining whether an election could be ordered on the
condition of contract assumption is that under the Hershey rule, the incumbent
union is also free to bargain for contract changes if it wins the election. The basis
for this policy is the belief that the incumbent union should be placed at full parity
with the rival union in the election campaign, unbound by the limitations of the
existing contract in establishing a campaign platform. Where, however, the rival
union has agreed to assume the existing contract, as a condition precedent to an
election, there is no logical reason to allow a winning incumbent the right of up-
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nation was unnecessary. Any kind of election that might be held,
by subjecting the incumbent union to possible replacement, would
discourage it from accepting governmentally sponsored procedures.0
This perfunctory treatment of the contract assumption question
seems insufficient in that the Board again emphasizes the necessity
of insuring union acceptance of periods of government intervention.
Because unions can presently be coerced into such acceptance any-
way, allowing representational elections at this time would offer
no significant threat to public efforts to insure production continuity
in the industry. The Board could have presented a better reason
for arriving at the same conclusion by frankly admitting that sub-
jecting the incumbent union to possible replacement under these
circumstances would be inequitable. Hence, even if the Board
could protect the governmentally sired contract by conditioning an
election upon the rival union's assumption of the contract, the basic
objection of unfairness would not thereby be alleviated.
In evaluating the new bar rule formulated in the Aerojet case
it is difficult to characterize its nature or to predict its future ap-
plication. The new policy cannot be allied with the contract bar
rule, since the major impact of the decision is not protection of the
contract, but rather protection of the incumbent union as a co-
operating entity.31 However, the NLRB's departure from generally
accepted rules in holding that government intervention would act
as a bar to an election was not wholly without precedent. During
World War II it was held that when a labor dispute was submitted
to the War Labor Board32 for arbitration, an election petition filed
setting a contract it has recently negotiated. See Petrowitz, The Effect of a Change
of Bargaining Representative, 10 LAB. L.J. 845, 859-60 (1959). See generally Chamber-
lain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. RFv. 829 (1948);
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 Micn. L. Rtv. 1
(1958); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. R.v.
999 (1955).
30 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 19773.
81 In this respect the new bar rule is somewhat analogous to the Board's one year
certification rule, which protects newly certified unions from representational chal-
lenges for a reasonable length of time-ordinarily one year. See Franks Bros. Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944), affirming 137 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1943), enforcing 44
N.L.R.B. 898 (1943); NLRB v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 154 F.2d 385 (6th
Cir. 1946); Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 90 (1945); Monarch Aluminum Mfg.
Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 1 (1942). The avowed purpose for this rule is to further industrial
stability by promoting the bargaining relationship. Pragmatically this means that
the newly certified union must be protected as an entity in order to foster a workable
bargaining relationship.
2 The War Labor Board was established by executive order on January 12, 1942,
and was terminated in the same manner on December 31, 1945. The Board, headed
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by a rival union would be dismissed even though no contract existed
between the employer and the incumbent union at the time of
filing.3 3 While the Aerojet case is too readily distinguishable from
the War Labor Board cases to categorize the new bar rule as merely
a modem version of those cases,34 the policy considerations moti-
vating the respective decisions are similar. The Board adhered to
the philosophy of protecting incumbent unions who of necessity
cooperate with government efforts to avoid strikes and stabilize
industrial relations in key defense industries.35
The Aerojet case demonstrates a willingness on the part of the
Board to depart from rigid rules in the administration of labor
policy when warranted in the public interest.3 6 By explicitly
limiting the Aerojet decision to "the particular circumstances in
this case," 37 the Board indicated that such departures would be on
an ad hoc basis. Nothing, however, in the language or reasoning
of the opinion prevents the new bar rule from being applied to
similar situations arising in other critical defense industries.
by Dr. George Taylor, arbitrated over 20,000 labor disputes. Arbitration was volun-
tary, arising out of no-strike pledges in industry. Theoretically, its determinations
had binding status only when accorded such by the parties. Strikes, however, usually
resulted in government seizure and operation of the plant or factory involved.
TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUsTRiAL RELAIONS 132-71 (1948).
"3 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America, 53 N.L.R.B. 593 (1943); Kennecott Copper
Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1943); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 306 (1943);
cf. Coming Glass Works, 54 N.L.R.B. 963 (1944).
3 The War Labor Board cases, supra note 33, involved newly certified unions
which were felt to have had no real opportunity to enjoy exclusive representation,
whereas the IAM had been certified at Aerojet-General since 1944. A further
distinguishing feature is that under arbitration the parties themselves generally
cease to bargain over disputed issues and turn over the decision making responsi-
bilities to the arbitrators. The mediation process, however, is designed merely to
influence the course of collective bargaining between the parties by encouraging
compromise. Thus, in the War Labor Board cases, the parties were awaiting
the results of arbitration when the election petitions were filed while in Aerojet
the parties were still bargaining when the UMAT filed its petition.
8 Compare the Aerojet case with Kennecott Copper Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1140
(1943), where the Board stated: "An election at the present time might serve
to negate the proceedings of the War Labor Board, require new proceedings before
that Board, and create uncertainty and unsettled bargaining conditions for an
additional indeterminate period. From the standpoint of stable labor relations, it is
undesirable to penalize a statutory representative for unavoidable delays consequent
upon its voluntary acceptance of orderly procedures established by governmental
authority for the adjustment of differences with an employer." Id. at 1144.
"0 But see Friedin, supra note 1, at 93.
74 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 19773. In another aerospace industry case decided after
Aerojet, Boeing Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1963), the Board held that the bargaining
unit sought to be organized was inappropriate. The Board concluded that it was
unnecessary to decide whether government intervention would act as a bar to an
election petition filed by the rival union in that case.
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Wherever such situations arise, the element of voluntary coopera-
tion would appear to be an essential requisite for the new policy's
application." However, the Board gave little guidance for facili-
tating a determination of what situations might warrant application
of the new bar.39 The Board offered no definition of what consti-
tutes government intervention or when such intervention becomes
significant enough to justify imposition of the new policy.40 In
addition, the Board failed to elaborate on whether a period of
government intervention might indefinitely bar an election petition
or whether it would act as a bar for only a limited period of time.41
Nor did the Board suggest a means by which the termination of
such intervention might be calculated.42  Apparently the Board pre-
36 It could be argued that application of the new bar rule would still be
warranted even when the element of "cooperation" is lacking, as, for example,
during the life of a Taft-Hartley injunction. The "cooperation" lauded by the Board
is largely illusory. See Brief for Intervenor, p. 9 n.8. Whether government inter-
vention takes direct or indirect forms, the equities are at least similar. In both
instances the denial of the union's use of the strike may leave the union particularly
vulnerable to representational challenges. See note 21 supra and accompanying
text. However, it should be recognized that there may be greater justification for
denying an election in terms of industrial stability when an incumbent union
"cooperates" with government sponsored procedures.
80 Obviously some type of government intervention into the collective bargaining
process of a key defense industry must be present before the new bar rule will be
applicable.
40 Whether government intervention is present in an industry should be a question
preliminary to a determination of whether that intervention acts as a bar to an
election. The Board did not try to define what specific acts by what government
officials might comprise significant government presence in the collective bargaining
process. It is suggested that government intervention should act as a bar only when
it is of such magnitude that the right to strike is eliminated as a practical matter.
Mere attempts by government agencies, such as the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service, to influence the functioning of the bargaining process, where the right
to strike is retained, dearly should not be viewed as government intervention
significant enough to bar an election.
4"The determination of how long government intervention might act as a bar
suggests three alternative solutions. First, government intervention might bar an
election indefinitely. This would appear to usurp unreasonably the statutory
right of employees to choose their bargaining representative. Secondly, a specific
maximum length of time during which government intervention would act as a bar
might be formulated. However, no suitable criteria seem to be available for
establishing such a maximum period. The current three-year maximum bar period
for contracts is not sufficiently analogous because contracts offer greater stability of
industrial relations and consequently justify a longer postponement of an election
than does government intervention. The third and most desirable alternative is
that government intervention would act to bar an election for a reasonable time
only. The Board's flexible approach in the Aerojet case indicates that this course
will be followed in the future.
"2Petitioner (UMAT) argued that government intervention at Aerojet-General
had ended when its election petition was filed. Brief for Petitioner, p. 5-6.
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ferred to remain on a pragmatic basis, unbound by predetermina-
tions and free to judge future cases on their individual merits.43
Characteristically, by refusing to exercise its power to order a
representation election at Aerojet, the Board has attempted to
facilitate the implementation of "other instruments of national
labor policy" 44 within its sphere of influence.45  The question
whether the new bar rule does complement the public policy of
insuring maximum production in this industry is inextricably
involved with the unique circumstances of individual cases. If
employees are saddled with unpopular bargaining representatives
resulting dissatisfaction may reduce plant morale and efficiency.
This in turn may lower levels of production and, hence, tend to
defeat the ultimate justification for government intervention.46
Even if the new bar rule successfully assists public efforts to prevent
production stoppages, there is still the danger that, within the scope
of its application, the new policy may encourage an even greater
reliance on governmental formulas and discourage private solu-
tions. The matter of increased government intrusion into this
particular arena of collective bargaining, however, is not amenable
to Board solution. Rather, the desirable extent of participation by
the government in the collective bargaining process must be de-
termined by more lofty echelons of national labor policy-making.
13 The landmark case of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 832 U.S. 194 (1947) legitimized an
administrative agency's utilization of the ad hoc approach, despite the fact that such
an approach is, of necessity, retroactive in application. See Leedom v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (retroactive application of new
contract bar policy by NLRB not violative of constitutional due process). But cf.
NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955) (party relying
on previously unrenounced contract provision policy not guilty of unfair labor
practice); NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952) (retroactive
application of change in jurisdictional policy held abuse of discretion). For an outline
of policy considerations which the author suggests should guide an administrative
agency's determination of whether to incorporate an ad hoc approach, see Baker,
Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
658 (1957).
"14 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 19778.
5ollowing the Supreme Court's directive in Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 816
U.S. 31 (1942), reversing 120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941), the Board has refused to
exercise its jurisdiction when to do so would interfere with other legitimate efforts,
both public and private, to regulate labor relations. See, e.g., West Indian Co.,
129 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961) (certification of union by Virgin Islands agency held bar
to representation election); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (Board de-
clined to exercise unfair labor practice jurisdiction in favor of private arbitration).
,1 See, e.g., Trailer Co. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1943).
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